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Minot was selected as the place for holding the 1928 annual meeting, and the tentative dates fixed between September ist and 15th.
AMERICA AND THE WORLD COURT
In our July issue we referred briefly to certain questions put to
us by the American Foundation Maintaining the American Peace
Award, and, by way of rejoinder to our item, we are asked: "Is it not
true that the whole basis of international law is unanimity, and that
this makes the situation rather different from that of national laws and
national courts, since these laws are not set up by the unanimous consent of all citizens ?"
We answer the foregoing by saying that this appears to us like
making distinctions without a difference. We know of no private contracts without a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, and
meeting of the minds suggests "unanimity" to us; but we know, also,
that the utmost of harmony and unanimity existing at the' time the
parties sign their respective names to a document may quickly change
to very determined opposing convictions, so determined, indeed, that
only the power behind the LAST COURT IN THE LAND can dispose of the issue. And, just as many a signer of a private document
determines when and under what circumstances he will accept the
second party's interpretations or fight it out to the last court-and
the potential force and power back of it-so individual nations, no
matter how freely or how often they submit their differences to a
world court, will make the determination when the test comes, and, if
the conclusion of the collective will of the individual nation is that
the issue is grave enough, then the fact that there is no power to compel submission to the court's decision will have much to do with the
determination of the question whether or not the individual nation
abides by an adverse decision.
The Foundation also requests consideration of the following interpretations of the second part of the fifth reservation to U. S. participation in the World Court. The reservation reads: "Nor shall it
(the Court), without the consent of the United States, entertain any
request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in
which the United States has or claims an interest."
It is claimed by members of The Foundation that the reasonable
legal interpretation (see October Atlantic Monthly) is that this "authorizes the U. S. to oppose the giving of an advisory opinion by the Court
in cases in which the U. S. is a party, and also in cases in which the
U. S., while not a party, has a direct material interest, the Court being
the judge as to the existence of the interest."
We feel constrained to take issue on that point. However desirable it may be to have the reservation in that form, it isn't in that form,

BAR BRIEFS

and we must agree with "a few influential members of the Senate"
that the United States and not the World Court would, under the
quoted phraseology, be the judge of the existence of the interest.
The mere fact that, under a given state of facts, such an interpretation might prove to be unreasonable, as giving the U. S. power to
prevent an advisory opinion upon a question affecting two other nations
directly and immediately-but apparently affecting the U. S. only
potentially-would not justify changing the plain meaning of the
words used. It appears to us that this "reasonable legal interpretation"
suggested by The Foundation spells modification in the name of clarification.
ENGLAND'S 1927 MESSAGE

Lord Chief Justice Hewart of England, upon the occasion of his
visit and welcome to the American Bar Association meeting last month,
made a speech, a very good speech. We "lift" from it two short passages. They are pertinent and potent:
"The word democracy is now on everybody's lips, but perhaps
you are often, as I am, inclined to wonder what meaning is intended by
the good people who employ it. You might think sometimes, from the
context in which the word appears, that it meant a patent medicine
or a fancy religion or some misty idealism belonging to wonderland.
It means, of course, nothing of the kind. Lawyers, at any rate, will
not be disposed to contradict the statement that democracy is simply
the name of a particular form of government; that is to say, that form
of government under which the sovereign political power in a state is
distributed among all the citizens of the state."
"Has there not been during recent years, and is there not now, a
marked and increasing development of bureaucratic pretensions, the
essence and the aims of which are to withdraw more and more matters
and topics from the jurisdiction of the courts and to set them apart
for purely official determination? . . In England, at any rate,
nobody who has eyes to see can fail to discern this mischievous purpose, which exhibits itself in at least three ways. One is by statute
to provide in express terms that the decision of certain questions belongs
to this or that government department, that the departmental decision
is to be final and binding upon all parties, and that that decision is
not to be questioned in a court of law by proceedings in mandamus,
certiorari, case stated, or otherwise. Another way is to confer upon
government department power to make rules and regulations which,
when they are made, are to have the force of a statute. And yet a
third way is by statute to empower a government department to make
orders for the removal of difficulties, as it is pleasantly called, and
actually for that purpose even to modify the provisions of the statute
itself."
ECONOMIC SURPLUS DISTRIBUTION
Dean Pound's address at the annual meeting is worth re-reading,
and possibly, some pondering. While he may have repeated some
things that he said in other years, as intimated by some who heard the
Dean, he brought his material and his statements right up to date. We

